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Werner Osenberg’s Visions of the 
“Totaleinsatz” of the entire German 
Research Potential in Total War
Michael Jung
The article deals with an example of a scientist who developed a number 
of visions how one could exploit science for the Nazi war aims. Wer-
ner Osenberg was professor at technical university of Hannover since 
1938. Since 1933 he was a member of the NSDAP, the SS, and worked 
for the SD (the Nazi spy apparatus). He had access to the highest party 
and government bodies. From the beginning of the Second World War 
he was involved in war research, from 1943 acting as head of the plan-
ning board in the Reichsforschungsrat. Osenberg’s special attention was 
directed at scientific research designed to achieve the Nazi war aims. 
The development of weaponry especially for the Navy was one of his 
particular interests. In 1943 Osenberg addressed several memoranda to 
Hitler and other leaders of the Nazi state, in which he assessed the dev-
astating German war situation. He deplored the insufficient utilization 
of available capacities of the German research potential. Following Hit-
ler’s maxim that “this war ... [is] not only a war of soldiers, but especially 
also of the technician,” Osenberg developed a vision for the intensifica-
tion of the German research program, in order to change the course 
of the war.
“A requirement of total war is the total deployment [“Totaleinsatz”] of 
our entire research potential,” Werner Osenberg headlined an extensive 
memorandum at the end of July 1944.1 In this text, he summarized on 
the one hand his ideas for the successful organization of technical and 
1 In German, “Ein Erfordernis des totalen Krieges ist der Totaleinsatz unseres gesamten 
Forschungspotentials,” Bundesarchiv, Germany (hereafter: BArch) Berlin R 26 III, Nr. 49, 
sheet 127.
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scientific war research, a topic that he had already addressed in previ-
ous memoranda to leading figures in the Nazi government and military 
apparatus. On the other hand, he refined his ideas regarding the changed 
war situation and wanted to make his contribution to the Endsieg (final 
victory) which he still believed was possible. Initially, brief glances at the 
research situation in Germany, his personality, and his background are 
necessary to understand Osenberg’s intentions.2
Research
This section briefly surveys the social atmosphere in which scientific 
research had to be carried out in Nazi Germany. Science was not exactly 
one of the passions of the Nazis. This does not mean that the National 
Socialists did not make use of scientific research and development. The 
opposite was the case: considerable resources were spent on research and 
development, but the Nazi effort was not primarily about promoting sci-
ence, but about promoting Nazi aims. It was an instrumentalisation of 
science by the NSDAP.3
The legends of the Wunderwaffen (wonder weapons) such as the 
“V-rockets” or the turbojet bomber Me 262, enjoyed a high priority in 
popular memory. But they cloud the view of the true situation of the 
research. The social environment of the Nazi period can be described as 
hostile towards science. Characteristically, for this is a statement from the 
leader of the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Labour Front, a Nazi trade 
union organization), Robert Ley, who said: “A professor may be sitting 
for many years in a laboratory to detect bacteria. However, I would prefer 
2 The following section summarizes the chapter about research in Nazi-Germany in Michael 
Jung, “Voll Begeisterung schlagen unsere Herzen zum Führer,” – Die Technische Hochschule 
Hannover und ihre Professoren im Nationalsozialismus (Norderstedt: BOD, 2013), esp. 271–281.
3 For contrasting views of “hostility to science” and the “competitive situation” of science 
organization, see a recent publication: Sören Flachowsky, Rüdiger Hachtmann, Florian 
Schmaltz, “Wissenschaftspolitik, Forschungspraxis und Ressourcenmobilisierung im NS-
Herrschaftssystem,” – Ressourcenmobilisierung. Wissenschaftspolitik und Forschungspraxis im 
NS-Herrschaftssystem, ed. Sören Flachowsky, RüdigerHachtmann, Florian Schmaltz (Göttin-
gen: Wallsteini, 2016), pp. 7-32.
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every street sweeper. He takes his broom and sweeps with a single gesture 
thousands of bacteria into the gutter.”4
Though there were certainly a range of attitudes towards the uni-
versities and the sciences, the technical universities enjoyed a greater 
appreciation of the Nazi leadership due to their range of subjects and as 
application-oriented institutions. Research and development were there-
fore instrumentalized in the preparation and execution of the war, and 
the general anti-scientific environment did not prevent the Nazis from 
putting large sums of money into projects which were useful to their 
aims. The Reich Ministry for Science, Education and Popular Culture 
(Reichsministerium für Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung – REM) 
was in charge of research organization. 
However, it was in a weak position in the Nazi leadership hierarchy, 
and in fact could not assume any leading function. In addition to the 
REM, the high commands of the branches of military service were heav-
ily involved in the field, in which the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (Minis-
try of Aviation – RLM) under Göring had been particularly active, and 
the Ministries of Armaments and War Production (Speer), Economic 
Affairs, and Posts, the latter in particular in the field of war-important 
telecommunications. In addition, other influential actors such as the 
SS-institution Ahnenerbe (Ancestral Heritage) and the Notgemeinschaft 
der deutschen Wissenschaft (Emergency Association of German Science, 
NDW; later Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) were at work.
A very special role was played by the Four-Year-Plan authority, which 
was established in 1936 by Hitler personally in a secret memorandum, 
which decreed:
1)  “the German army ... [should] be ready in 4 years”,
2)  “the German economy ... [should] be ready for war in 4 years”.5
This authority was headed by Göring as “plenipotentiary” and 
equipped with sufficient resources to stimulate the production of arma-
ments for war preparation and management. In this context, the Reichs-
4 Quoted after Helmut Joachim Fischer, Erinnerungen. Teil I: Von der Wissenschaft zum 
Sicherheitsdienst (Ingolstadt: Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungsstelle, 1984), 178. Undated.
5 Ibid., 273.
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forschungsrat (Reich Research Council, RFR) was formed, which had 
to coordinate the scientific and technical research important for war. 
However, the RFR was unable to connect the above mentioned compet-
ing research institutions into a unified research network due to its orga-
nizational connection and infrastructure. A second RFR was set up in 
1942, this time under the leadership of Göring, and, although there were 
gradual changes, the basic problem of the competitive situation was not 
resolved.
Werner Osenberg
Born in 1900 in Zeitz in the middle of Germany, Werner Osenberg par-
ticipated in the last two months of the First World War as a navy cadet, 
after passing his baccalaureate (high school exams).6 From 1919 he stud-
ied medicine for two semesters. After that, he graduated in mechanical 
engineering at the technical universities of Munich and Dresden. After 
a short period in an engineering office, he worked from 1927 to 1938 as 
research assistant at the department of technical science of management 
at the Technical University Dresden, an extraordinarily long time in this 
function. In 1929 he was awarded Dr.-Ing. (PhD), appointed in 1938 the 
Chair of Machine Tools at the Technical University Hannover (Technische 
Hochschule Hannover) and became the director of the institute with the 
same name.
This appointment was unusual. Osenberg was not on the actual 
appointments list, which carried three other peoples’ names and which 
had been sent by the university to the responsible ministry. It is true he 
was mentioned there, but only as someone who might be a later option 
for such a position, after further probation in practice. An engineering 
professor from the Technical University Danzig was first appointed, who 
was considered an expert in his field. However, before he could start his 
new position, he died on the way to his new place of activity from, as 
6 “CV Osenberg,” BArch Berlin R26 III, Nr. 43, sheet 33–35; about the appointment of Osen-
berg see Jung, “Voll Begeisterung schlagen,” 188–194.
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reported, a heart attack. That death, however, did not lead to the sec-
ond or third-placed candidates to take over the chair. The appointment of 
Osenberg was decided in a very rapid arrangement between then rector 
of the Technische Hochschule Hannover, a well-known Nazi activist, and 
the leadership of the NSDAP in Munich.
Considerable doubts existed about his professional qualifications – 
as briefly mentioned – already at that time. Thus, his predecessor, the 
well-respected professor Friedrich Schwerd, resisted the appointment of 
Osenberg for this reason vigorously. Later, this view has been confirmed 
by a more or less “neutral” side: “His technical and scientific knowledge 
were well below par,” as Samuel Goudsmit formulated shortly after the 
end of the Second World War.7 Goudsmit had the opportunity as a mem-
ber of the “Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee” (CIOS) 
of the Allied occupation powers to examine Osenberg in detail during 
his internment after the war and could therefore consider his person. 
The CIOS collected from 1945 onwards information on the scientific, 
 technical and industrial capacity of Germany.
However, Osenberg was a member of the NSDAP and the SS since 
1933. As of 1936 he was part of the SD (Security Service of the Reichsfüh-
rer SS) and had access to influential party and government bodies. This 
seems to have been the true ticket to his professorial career.
“He was inspired by a mania for organization and a passion for card 
indexes,” noticed Goudsmit in 1945.8 He benefited from this mania in the 
organization of war research after the beginning of the war. After being 
active in research, particularly for the navy, since 1940, he acted as head 
of the Planungsamt des Reichsforschungsrates, the Planning Department 
of the Reich Research Council from 1943 onwards, and had a relatively 
large influence on the German research organizations.9 The question, 
7 Samuel A. Goudsmit, Alsos. Vol. 1 The History of Modern Physics 1800–1950 (Los Angeles: 
Tomash Publishers, 1983), 187. First published in New York in 1947.
8 Ibid.
9 The Planungsamt was established at Osenberg’s suggestion the same year. About Osenberg’s 
activities in the Planungsamt: Ruth Federspiel, “Mobilisierung der Rüstungsforschung? Werner 
Osenberg und das Planungsamt im Reichsforschungsrat 1943–1945,” – Rüstungsforschung im 
Nationalsozialismus. Organisation, Mobilisierung und Entgrenzung der Technikwissenschaften, 
ed. Helmut Maier (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002), 72–105.
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why at a first glance an ordinary professor from a rather smallish techni-
cal university could ascend to such a leadership position, Goudsmit dis-
closed shortly after the war: “The Security Service of the Elite Guard (SD 
der SS) […] also boasted of a ‘cultural’ department, Section IIIc, headed 
by a Wilhelm Spengler. Osenberg was Spengler’s right-hand man for the 
sciences. The function of this section was to enforce the Nazi doctrine at 
educational and cultural institutions. This was done by means of squeal-
ers and investigators who reported directly to Osenberg. […] In addi-
tion, Osenberg collected data on their [the scientists’] attitude towards 
the Nazi doctrine.”10
Memoranda
Shortly after the beginning of the Second World War Osenberg’s institute 
was declared as “Wehrbetrieb,” which meant that its work was completely 
converted to the needs of the war. A short time later, the installation of a 
“marine development department” and the conversion of the remaining 
part of the institute into a “Four-Year-Plan Institute for Manufacturing 
Process” followed.11 Thus, the official acceptance of Osenberg’s projects 
was given by the head of the Four-Year-Plan Authority Reichsmarschall 
and Reich Aviation Minister Göring. Osenberg stated, however, that 
the absolute mobilization of scientific capacity for the Nazi war aims in 
many university research institutions was not the rule and the existing 
possibilities were only fractionally used. This statement led him to the 
formulation of several memoranda addressed to the highest party and 
government bodies, in which he developed his ideas for the utilization 
of the entire technical and scientific research potential in Germany for 
achieving the aim of the Endsieg. Thus he remained in the tradition of the 
leaders of the technically educated elite, who were strongly influenced by 
the experience of the First World War. They repeatedly emphasized “the 
high importance of technology” for warfare, as they had concluded that 
10 Goudsmit, Alsos, 189.
11 “CV Osenberg,” l.c., sheet 34.
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the defeat of 1918 had a lot to do with the insufficient use of the possibili-
ties of technical sciences.12
Osenberg assessed the devastating German “war situation as a result 
of insufficient utilization of available capacities of the German research” 
in his third memorandum, written on December 28, 1943.13 He consid-
ered in greater detail the – in his view – deficient situation of war research 
and those measures which in his opinion could solve the problems. This 
memorandum was submitted to the head of the Party Chancellery Martin 
Bormann, the Commander of the Air Force and the Ministry of Avia-
tion Göring, and the Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler in early  January 
1944, and later in the year to the Reich Minister for Armaments and 
War Production Albert Speer, and the head of the SS Leadership Main 
Office Hans Jüttner. Bormann was asked to submit the memorandum 
to Hitler.
The first, very detailed section deals with measures Osenberg had 
introduced previously in his functions in research management, in 
order to intensify the war research. Starting from the statement that “no 
influence on the research and its utilization for military equipment was 
exerted by the responsible authorities in the first two years of the war,”14 
he pointed out the necessity of activating the “even in the fifth year of 
the war still available capacities” as “inevitable for the war.” The previ-
ous measures were inter alia: 1) an “organization chart to activate the 
entire research” prepared for the Navy, which was implemented; 2) the 
collection of “600 research centres of German universities” with their 
human and material resources in a central file; 3) the establishment of 
the Planning Department of the Reich Research Council for the “iden-
tification and summary of war important tasks of defence technology” 
and launching “the creation of a unit of 3,000–5,000 first-class research-
12 For example the then rector of the TH Hannover in 1917, see: Königlich Technische Hoch-
schule zu Hannover, Die Übergabe des Rektorats am 30. Juni 1917 (Hannover: n.p. 1917), 3, 
located in Archiv der TIB/UniA Hannover, Hann. 146 A Acc. 62/81, Nr. 4. See also Stefan 
Willeke, “Die Technokratiebewegung zwischen den Weltkriegen und der ‘Kulturfaktor Tech-
nik’,” – Technische Intelligenz und “Kulturfaktor Technik”, ed. Burkhard Dietz, Michael Fessner, 
Helmut Maier (Münster, New York: Waxmann, 1996), 203–220.
13 BArch Berlin R 26 III, Nr. 49, sheet 142.
14 Ibid., sheet 143.
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ers and professionals” as “scientific stormtroopers” (wissenschaftlicher 
Stoßtrupp).15
Obviously, however, these initiated measures were not as successful as 
Osenberg had imagined. That brings him to the statement in the second 
section of the memorandum that still around 41 percent of potentially 
useful research institutes of the universities were “not used for the war 
effort.” Besides, he remarks that “according to the state of 7 December 
1943 [...] 3721 of the 5000 considered scientists were still found in the 
army in functions not corresponding to their qualifications.” Almost 80 
percent of fully trained engineers were deployed in the army in lower 
ranks, for example – as Osenberg smugly mentions – a professor of ther-
modynamics as warden in a military prison, an engineer of high-pressure 
steam and gas turbines for high-speed boats as a cleaner, and a chemist 
(a specialist in the field of carbon compounds) as a worker doing sim-
ple office work.16 He also mentions many examples, which in his view 
proved the “insufficient war effort [...] of the German research:” defects in 
radar engineering and torpedo development,17 and uneconomic meth-
ods in production engineering. Defining science as a type of weapon, he 
emphasized: “What unspeakable misery could have been avoided if one 
had given the researcher and the engineer his basic tools in time, his gun 
[emphasis Osenberg], with which he had been used to deal for years.”18
After a critical look at “the progress-inhibiting effects of misunder-
stood secrecy orders”19 in the exchange of research results as well as other 
sections on “the research organizations of enemy states”20 and regard-
ing the “outlined problems in the research sector of the German arms 
build-up,”21 Osenberg developed his ideas as “proposals to performance 
enhancement of our military research.”22 In order to use “science as a 
weapon”, Osenberg regarded the following measures as essential:
15 Ibid., sheet 154.
16 Ibid., sheet 152.
17 Goudsmit, Alsos, 187.
18 BArch Berlin R 26 III, Nr. 49, sheet 151.
19 Ibid., sheet 150.
20 Ibid., sheet 155 et seq.
21 Ibid., sheet 157 et seq.
22 Ibid., sheet 159 et seq.
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1)  Centralization of research organization in the Reich Research 
Council (RFR);
2)  transfer of the personnel and financial responsibility of the main 
research institutes towards the RFR;
3)  establishment of a “problem collection point” for military engi-
neering, situated at Osenberg’s Planning Department of the RFR, 
which executed the transmission of tasks to relevant research 
institutions for solving the problems;
4)  communication of research results to competent bodies of the 
Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production and the 
affected parts of the army;
5)  establishment of a “research survey” to control the utilization of 
research facilities and the exclusion of projects not important for 
the war;
6)  establishment of a department for the identification of “modern” 
production processes and implementation and steering of the 
operation of “scientific stormtroopers,” e.g. for production of new 
weapons.
Organizational chart of the “Wehrforschungsgemeinschaft“.  
BArch Berlin R 26 III, Nr. 112, sheet 214
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This third memorandum seems to have been hardly noticed, like the first 
two. Although the Planning Department of the RFR that he had proposed 
was established in 1943, the “repatriation” of under-qualified scientists 
employed by the army was initiated and although certain requirements of 
confidentiality were relaxed, the number of scientists which could restart 
their research activities were far from the requested 5000.23 All other 
ideas remained unrealized until mid-1944.
This brought Osenberg to launch another attempt to intensify the war 
research. On 31 July 1944, at a time when Germany’s military situation in 
view of the Allied invasion and the offensive of the Red Army in the east 
appeared hopeless to every rational thinking person, he wrote the initially 
mentioned headline with the significant title: “A requirement of total war 
is the total deployment of our entire research potential.” Following the 
“decree of the Führer about the total war deployment” and Hitler’s state-
ment that “this war ... (is) not only a war of soldiers, but especially also the 
technician,”24 Osenberg summarized his visions in the main points, stated 
more precisely and completed it “to change course of the war definitively.”25
Like a guiding thread the emphasis is throughout the seven page doc-
ument on the importance of science for the outcome of the war. In the 
present phase of the war, it was “undoubtedly a question of the survival 
of the German people, to concede to the engineer, but especially to the 
researcher the place he deserves next to the fighting soldiers.” In sum-
mer 1944, Osenberg had the firm conviction that the war would have 
developed differently and more successfully for Nazi Germany, if a “total 
mobilization of under-used energies of German science at the beginning 
of the war” for the war research had taken place. He assumed that “a total 
activation of the German war research [...] is still possible” and that “it 
would have a decisive influence on the course of the war (air war, sub-
marine war and the like).”
Substantially new were his proposals to establish a “scientific advisory 
board” consisting of three professors with the possibility of reporting to 
23 According to Goudsmit there were 2500, according to Ruth Federspiel less than 4000, Fed-
erspiel, “Mobilisierung der Rüstungsforschung,” 89.
24 Hitler in a statement on 6 July 1944, cited by BArch Berlin R 26 III, no. 43, sheet 127.
25 Ibid.
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Hitler directly and participating “at important meetings at Hitler’s head-
quarters and at the Ministry of Speer” as well as the establishment of the 
so-called Wehrforschungsgemeinschaft (Defence research community). 
While the first wish – to directly report to Hitler – remained unrealized, 
Osenberg’s dream of the Wehrforschungsgemeinschaft became reality, at 
least on paper. On 24 August 1944, about three weeks after Osenberg pub-
lished his last paper, Göring signed a decree ordering the establishment of 
the new organization headed by Osenberg.26 Its stated aim was that all “in 
research engaged state and industrial institutes and laboratories [should 
be integrated] […] for the purpose of a uniform personal responsibility” 
and only those research projects be given the top priority, which were 
regarded as “decisive for the outcome of the war” by the RFR.27 Osen-
berg created a beautiful and very detailed organizational chart, he printed 
well-formulated explanations, and up to the 15th of October, 1944, more 
than a thousand scientific institutions from universities, industry and the 
armed forces reportedly wished to participate in “Osenberg’s bold plan of 
organization.”28 However, there is no proof of any effect the Wehrforschun-
gsgemeinschaft might have had. Instead, it seems to be the last convulsion 
of a desperately struggling scientific community against the “bitter end.”
At that time, Osenberg certainly saw the situation differently. Thus, 
he was still full of energy at the beginning of 1945. On the 21st of Janu-
ary 1945 he sent a proposal for the effective combating against enemy air 
formations to Hitler directly. For his project of an anti-aircraft missile 
named “Planet”, he had three weeks earlier applied for a patent. Now, at 
the end of January 1945, and about three months before the final end of 
Nazi Germany, he had the opinion “that it is still possible to change the air 
war situation almost instantly by implementing appropriate measures.”29 
For this purpose he had already received the approval of the “Reichs-
führer SS” Himmler, who gave him “all the support, especially from the 
manufacturing sector (concentration camps)” and to have “promised 
26 BArch Berlin R 26 III, Nr. 108, sheet 7.
27 BArch Berlin R 26 III, Nr. 112, sheet 216.
28 Karl-Heinz Ludwig, Technik und Ingenieure im Dritten Reich (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979), 
265.
29 BArch Berlin R 26 III, Nr. 49, sheet 108.
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later use of the projectiles by the Waffen-SS.” This new “wonder weapon” 
should form a “greater area denial and attack system” that could finally 
stand up to the overwhelming air supremacy of the Allies. The “Planet” 
rocket consisted of a carrier rocket, transporting up to 24 individual mis-
sile units, to attack enemy bombers in screw-shaped formations, able to 
be launched from land, air and sea.30
30 About Osenberg’s further developments of weapons see also: Jung, “Voll Begeisterung,” 
296–304; Birgit Schlegel, “Waffenentwicklungen unter Professor Werner Osenberg in Hanno-
ver (1941–1943) und in Lindau a. H. (1943–1945),” Northeimer Jahrbuch (2007): 75–107.
Warhead “Planet“. 
BArch Berlin R 26 III, 
Nr. 49, sheet 60
Examples of the use of “Planet“.  
BArch Berlin R 26 III, Nr. 49, sheet 111.
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Unlike many of his other proposals, this idea of Osenberg was met 
with great enthusiasm in the Nazi leadership – certainly in view of the 
miserable military situation. Thus it was insisted by the highest authority 
to develop this project as quickly as possible and the necessary investiga-
tions were started at Technische Hochschule Hannover and at the Aerody-
namic Research Institute of the University of Göttingen in the shortest 
possible time. First results were available on 29 March. Apart from the 
rather dubious technical feasibility of the project, it was already too late 
to finalize the project. Several days later, Allied troops reached the loca-
tion of Osenberg’s institute and the Planning Department of the RFR near 
Hannover and arrested him. In this situation he handed his entire archive 
over, including the records and card indexes covering the entire German 
research sector.31 This he had done due to his new vision: he thought he 
could use his knowledge to play a significant role in a new Germany.
Epilogue: after the war
This did not come true, but apart from a longer internment, Osenberg 
was hardly harmed by his commitment to the Nazi regime. Despite join-
ing the SS and the SD, he was classified in the denazification proceedings 
as “disburdened” because he “did not belong to an organization declared 
as being criminal in the Nuremberg trials,” as he himself remarked.32 
This demonstrably false classification was probably due to his coopera-
tion with the allied departments in investigating the German research 
capacities.33 He was, after a certain waiting period, again a professor at 
31 According to Lind Hunt the United States and Great Britain used Osenberg’s list of 15,000 
scientists of the Third Reich with a lot of fanatical Nazis “as a recruitment tool for decades,” 
Linda Hunt, Secret Agenda: the United States government, Nazi scientists, and project paperclip, 
1945 to 1990 (New York: St. Martins Press, 1991), 32 et seq. See also: “Examination of Dr. Ing. 
W. Osenberg,” NARA RG 331 UD 13D.
32 Letter of Osenberg to the rector of TH Hannover (27 November 1947), Archiv des Ham-
burger Instituts für Sozialforschung, PA Osenberg, sheet 92.
33 SS and SD were classified as criminal organizations at the Nuremberg Trial of the Major 
War Criminals. Inter alia, only members were excluded who were conscripted or exercised just 
simple activities like office work. This was not true for Osenberg.
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the Technical University Hannover and taught there until his retirement 
in 1970. He died in 1974.
What people would prefer to remember in later years was not Osen-
berg’s almost fanatical support for the Nazis, but what has been known 
as “Osenberg action”, i.e. the retrieval of scientists from the armed forces 
to more secure places in institutes. His ideas of “science as a weapon” and 
the role of scientists as “scientific stormtroopers” were not spoken of after 
the war, and his actions have been reinterpreted as non-political efforts to 
secure the continuity of the German research establishment. In 1956 the 
publication for the 125th anniversary of the university stated that: “These 
[Osenberg’s] measures have succeeded in that not only the human sub-
stance, but mostly also the values of the German scientific institutes for 
post-war tasks were preserved for the benefit of the German economy.”34 
Nine years later the rector of the university formulated in a congratula-
tory letter on Osenberg’s 65th birthday: “With this activity, you have done 
a beneficial work in saving the intellectual substance of Germany in the 
collapse.”35 And Osenberg is similarly honoured in the Catalogus Pro-
fessorum of Leibniz Universität Hannover, without any indication of his 
political activities before 1945.36
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